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A B S T R A C T   
This article describes and discusses nominated procurement as a means through which buyers select sub- 
suppliers to achieve sustainability compliance upstream in emerging economies’ supply chains. Hence, it criti-
cally examines the ways buyers articulate nominated procurement and the unfolding supply chain consequences. 
Based on in-depth interviews and fieldwork in the Sri Lankan apparel supply chain, the findings indicate that 
buyers accomplish sustainability compliance among their sub-suppliers while prioritizing their own business 
agenda. In doing so, however, buyers perpetuate “suboptimal compliance” of raw material suppliers and 
“sandwiching” of direct suppliers as harmful consequences on the supply chain. These consequences link theo-
retically with commercial, geographical, compliance and extended-compliance pressure. This article contributes 
to the advancement of the Sustainable Supply Chain Management literature by theorizing about nominated 
procurement, direct and indirect pressure, and pointing to the supply chain consequences beyond achievements 
in sustainability compliance.   
1. Introduction 
Due to recurrent industrial incidents affecting apparel supply chains 
in emerging economies, such as the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh 
(Fontana & Egels-Zandén, 2019), downstream international buying 
firms (hereinafter: buyers), such as clothing brands and retailers, are 
gradually being held responsible for managing sustainability compli-
ance (hereinafter: compliance) upstream in the supply chain (Andersen 
& Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; Gadde & Jonsson, 2018; Goworek et al., 2018; 
Karaosman, Perry, Brun, & Morales-Alonso, 2018; Turker & Altuntas, 
2014). This responsibility includes ensuring minimum environmental 
and social standards, not only among first-tier supplier firms (herein-
after: direct suppliers) but also along the entire supply chain (Crespin- 
Mazet & Dontenwill, 2012; Gimenez & Tachizawa, 2012; Harwood & 
Humby, 2008; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). 
Ensuring second-tier supplier (hereinafter: sub-supplier) compliance 
is particularly salient because “it is at this stage that the majority of 
natural resources tend to be consumed” (Mena Humphries, & Choi, 
2013:72) and this is “where the majority of [human] production activ-
ities occur” (Soundararajan & Brammer, 2018:55). However, much of 
the Sustainable Supply Chain Management (hereinafter: SSCM) litera-
ture indicates that attaining compliance in supply chains remains chal-
lenging, often exacerbated by the low visibility and geographical 
dispersion of sub-suppliers (Foerstl, Azadegan, Leppelt, & Hartmann, 
2015; Gereffi & Lee, 2012; Grimm, Hofstetter, & Sarkis, 2018; Turker & 
Altuntas, 2014; Wilhelm, Blome, Wieck, & Xiao, 2016). 
As a means to ascertain compliance, buyers are held accountable in 
the literature for the entire supply chain upstream. In practice, there is 
an increasing focus on how parties refer sub-supplier compliance to their 
direct suppliers as a domino-pattern of accountability. Still, firms could 
choose to implement alternative measures (Alexander, 2020; Briscoe, 
Dainty, Millett, & Neale, 2004; Chowdhury, Dewan, & Quaddus, 2013), 
* Corresponding and first author at: Sasin School of Management, Chulalongkorn University, Sasa Patasala Building, Soi Chula 12, Phyathai Road, Pathum Wan, 
10330, Bangkok, Thailand. 
E-mail addresses: enrico.fontana@sasin.edu (E. Fontana), Christina.Oberg@oru.se (C. Öberg), leon.poblete@chalmers.se (L. Poblete).  
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Journal of Business Research 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2021.01.040 
Received 16 June 2020; Received in revised form 19 January 2021; Accepted 21 January 2021   
Journal of Business Research 127 (2021) 179–192
180
which have presumed and distinct effects in terms of compliance. 
Indeed, the authors of this article discovered that some buyers nominate 
their sub-suppliers; that is, buyers select sub-suppliers and require that 
their direct suppliers source from these sub-suppliers. This realization 
inspired this research study. 
Most studies to date stress direct supplier accountability for their 
sub-suppliers (Assländer, Roloff, & Nayır, 2016; Soundararajan & 
Brammer, 2018; Wilhelm, Blome, Bhakoo, & Paulraj, 2016), and have 
not examined buyer nomination of sub-suppliers and how this impacts 
compliance and the supply chain. The purpose of this article is to 
describe and discuss nominated procurement as a means to achieve 
compliance upstream emerging economies’ supply chains. As such, the 
aim is to advance SSCM literature and answer recent calls to investigate 
the ways in which buyers extend their control upstream to manage sub- 
supplier compliance (Foerstl et al., 2015; Wilhelm, Blome, Bhakoo, 
et al., 2016). 
This article addresses the following two research questions:  
(1) How do buyers articulate nominated procurement in an emerging 
economy supply chain?  
(2) What are the consequences of nominated procurement on the 
supply chain? 
In addition to recurrent industry incidents and the increasing 
attention that is being given to business and society concerns, buyers are 
increasingly using accountability measures and outsourcing compliance 
in an attempt to dilute their responsibility for the whole supply chain. 
This makes nominated procurement an issue of high practical impor-
tance. Empirically, this research draws on qualitative fieldwork and 
interviews with senior managers from buyers, their direct suppliers, and 
nominated sub-suppliers in the apparel supply chain in Sri Lanka, an 
emerging economy. This context represents a timely and revealing field 
to inquire about nominated procurement and its consequences for 
different reasons. 
The Sri Lanka apparel supply chain has widely adopted nominated 
procurement and is deemed an example of excellence in South Asia for 
compliance (Jayasinghe, 2016; Kelegama, 2009; Ruwanpura & Wrigley, 
2011). Initiatives such as “Garments without Guilt” have helped to 
promote Sri Lanka as “a production destination concerned with ethical 
production, increasing workers’ quality of life, and poverty alleviation” 
(Ruwanpura, 2016:424). A few scholars, however, warn that low prices 
from buyers could exert negative pressure on compliance efforts 
(Pathirana & Heenkenda, 2011; Ruwanpura & Wrigley, 2011). This 
potential outcome suggests that nomination may be linked with other 
interests over and above compliance, with important supply chain 
consequences, as discussed in this article. 
From a theoretical perspective, this article contributes to the SSCM 
literature by theorizing about nominated procurement. Specifically, this 
research study informs that buyers articulate nominated procurement as 
a means to ensure sub-supplier compliance, but also to prioritize their 
own market agenda, which fosters suboptimal compliance along the 
supply chain. By conceptualizing sandwiching – a method whereby 
suppliers are squeezed by their buyers and excluded from taking part in 
decisions regarding the nomination of sub-suppliers – this article then 
elucidates the tensions related to nominated procurement and how these 
tensions can jeopardize the stability of the supply chain. This finding 
highlights the importance of reconfiguring nominated procurement as a 
more balanced and interdependent process that allows equal partici-
pation of all firms involved. Taken together, this article develops ideas 
on direct and indirect pressure, and on how compliance is utilized 
opportunistically by buyers for instrumental gain, at the cost of supply 
chain stability. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Section 2 in-
troduces the literature on SSCM and business networks, and delves into 
compliance and nomination as the theoretical pillars of this study; 
Section 3 describes the research process and the methods used to gather 
the empirical material; Section 4 sets out the research findings; Section 5 
discusses the results; and Section 6 considers the consequences for the-
ory and practice, before suggesting avenues for future research. 
2. Background and conceptual framework 
2.1. Theoretically framing sub-supplier compliance 
SSCM pertains to “the management of material, information, and 
capital flows as well as cooperation among companies along the supply 
chain” while pursuing “economic, environmental, and social goals” 
(Seuring & Müller, 2008:1700). By attempting to explicitly advance 
these sustainability or triple bottom line goals in redesigning the supply 
chain, SSCM has evolved into a fundamental field of research (Sarkis, 
Zhu, & Lai, 2011). 
The SSCM literature, more significantly, indicates that accomplish-
ing these triadic goals requires an understanding of how a firm carries 
responsibility for the activities of other parties, that is, how other parties 
comply with that firm’s responsibilities as they are distributed along the 
supply chain. Compliance is broadly defined by SSCM scholars as the 
alignment of economic, environmental, and social goals, thereby 
ensuring minimum standards with regards to, for example, pollution 
levels and wages (Foerstl et al., 2015). 
Despite the importance of demonstrating compliance in order for 
multi-tier suppliers to sell their products and for buyers to legitimize 
their operations (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; Gereffi & Lee, 2012; 
Wilhelm, Blome, Bhakoo, et al., 2016), ascertaining compliance in the 
supply chain remains challenging (Crespin-Mazet & Dontenwill, 2012; 
Gadde & Jonsson, 2018; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). SSCM scholars note 
that tensions and trade-offs between commercial benefits and costs often 
fuel a lack of compliance (Goworek et al., 2018; Harwood & Humby, 
2008; Karaosman et al., 2018; Turker & Altuntas, 2014). 
The most notable compliance breaches are attributed to sub- 
suppliers upstream in the supply chain (Grimm et al., 2018). Recent 
events, such as the Rana Plaza incident in Bangladesh where a sub- 
supplier factory collapsed, killing more than 1100 workers, shed light 
on the lack of sub-supplier compliance in apparel supply chains (Fon-
tana & Egels-Zandén, 2019). Given the “low risk of being penalized” 
(Villena & Gioia, 2018:74) and the lack of visibility from buyers (Foerstl 
et al., 2015; Wilhelm, Blome, Bhakoo, et al., 2016), sub-suppliers are 
frequently accused of passivity and opportunism (Foerstl et al., 2015; 
Leppelt, Foerstl, & Hartmann, 2013). These points highlight the diffi-
culties of ensuring sub-supplier compliance. 
Although the SSCM literature assumes that buyers are unable to 
manage the entire supply chain on their own (Assländer et al., 2016; 
Leppelt et al., 2013), it has proposed two contrary compliance ap-
proaches (Mena et al., 2013; Tachizawa & Wong, 2014; Wilhelm, Blome, 
Bhakoo, et al., 2016). The traditional and most-widely studied approach 
is based on the collaboration of buyers with direct suppliers to make 
them accountable for their sub-supplier compliance (Foerstl et al., 2015; 
Grimm, Hofstetter, & Sarkis, 2016; Grimm et al., 2018; Soundararajan & 
Brammer, 2018). This unfolds as each party upstream in the supply 
chain holds the next one accountable, as a domino effect. Against this 
backdrop, buyers view direct suppliers as conduits (Wilhelm, Blome, 
Bhakoo, et al., 2016) or key bridges (Mena et al., 2013) that help them 
ensure sub-supplier compliance from upstream. Critiques, however, 
express caution about delegating accountability to direct suppliers 
because of the risks to buyers. Buyers may not only lose visibility of sub- 
supplier compliance, but also an awareness of costs, commercial issues, 
and the ability to innovate (Choi & Linton, 2011). 
The second approach deals with the ways in which the buyer can 
establish direct relationships in a network structure which includes sub- 
suppliers (Alexander, 2020). This approach may require the buyer to 
take responsibility by creating common compliance norms along the 
supply chain (Briscoe et al., 2004), expecting parties upstream to simply 
adhere with its requirements (Villena & Gioia, 2018), or selecting multi- 
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tier suppliers that exhibit a compliance orientation (Crespin-Mazet & 
Dontenwill, 2012). 
While these ways of handling compliance along the supply chain 
share some characteristics with nominated procurement, they do not 
explicitly refer to the circumstance in which buyers select sub-suppliers 
with the purpose of ensuring higher compliance. They also do not 
consider suppliers and sub-suppliers in emerging economies, nor take 
account of the additional complexities that relate to contextual distance 
and variance in norms and regulations. Perhaps more problematically, 
these approaches do not elaborate upon the broader consequences that 
might ensue, not only with regard to compliance but also with regard to 
potential supply chain effects. These are issues that this article sets out to 
address. 
2.2. Theoretically framing pressure and sub-supplier nomination in supply 
chains: a business network approach 
Accountability has been a dominating idea, in terms of how to obtain 
compliance in supply chains (Foerstl et al., 2015; Grimm et al., 2016; 
Grimm et al., 2018; Soundararajan & Brammer, 2018). Accountability 
may entail both proactive and reactive measures, where proactiveness 
can manifest as pressure and reactiveness as control. Pressure can be 
understood as a ‘demanding or stimulating situation’ in SSCM, which is 
then translated into policy on social responsibility (Walker, di Sisto, & 
McBain, 2008; Wycherley, 1999). Meanwhile, control refers to reactive 
intermediations with potential punishment as its consequence. Once a 
buyer no longer directly holds the next party in the upstream supply 
chain accountable, as demonstrated through nomination, the focus turns 
to pressure manifested through the selection of sub-suppliers. 
Pressure has been shown to have a moderating impact on sustain-
ability practices and outcomes (Zhu & Sarkis, 2006). For instance, Zhu, 
Sarkis, and Lai (2007) argue that increasing pressure from opposite ends 
of the supply chain prompts Chinese automobile supply chain managers 
to implement green supply chain management practices and, in so 
doing, improve both economic and environmental performance. 
Research also demonstrates that pressure in supply chains drives sus-
tainable production and process innovation (Preuss, 2007). Collins, 
Lawrence, Pavlovich, and Ryan (2007) explore the extent to which firms 
are influenced by external and internal pressure to adopt sustainable 
practices in New Zealand. They propose that the adoption of sustain-
ability programs hinges on the pressure to execute environmental and 
social activities. 
In theoretical studies on pressure as a proactive means of achieving 
compliance, pressure works better when associated with high trust for 
direct suppliers and sub-suppliers. In describing its positive effects, for 
instance, Preuss (2007) explains how greater freedom is key to help 
parties to navigate their mutual issues. Trust emerges as the tool through 
which proactivity is communicated and, if functioning well, through 
which a firm is selected. If, however, trust is absent and if selections are 
based on divergent parameters, issues are likely to arise. Linking pres-
sure with the nomination of sub-suppliers in emerging economies raises 
additional concerns that require consideration, which pertain to 
geographical distance and the indirect relations between buyers and 
sub-suppliers. 
In order to fully comprehend the indirectness of buyers and sub- 
suppliers, the research stream on business networks functions as a 
point of departure (Anderson, Håkansson, & Johanson, 1994). Research 
on networks is particularly suitable because indirectness is rarely pro-
blematized in relation to supply chains, and this research departs from 
the notion that trust provides the basis of the relational connections that 
form between firms (Andersson & Mattsson, 2010; Baraldi, Havenvid, 
Linné, & Öberg, 2019; Baraldi, Gressetvold, & Harrison, 2012; Öberg, 
2010). Business networks are defined as spatial structures constituted by 
relational interdependencies between embedded actors (Andersson & 
Mölleryd, 1999; Brennan & Turnbull, 2002). Business network research 
has focused on how parties are interconnected, where interconnectivity 
means that decisions made in one business relationship affect other re-
lationships. This has opened the way for research on the consequences of 
nomination on the supply chain. Rather than passively adapt, the 
interconnectivity and interdependence of firms suggests relational reci-
procity (Olsen, Prenkert, Hoholm, & Harrison, 2014). Hence, a focal 
firm “manages in business networks” rather than simply managing 
business networks (Ritter, Wilkinson, & Johnston, 2004:175), based on 
assumed reactions, parallel behaviors and assumptions. As the business 
network literature operationalizes supply chains as linear networks, 
interconnectivity implies that a buyer can exert influence over sub- 
suppliers even though they may lack a direct commercial business 
relationship with them (Andersson, 2012; Andersson & Mattsson, 2010; 
Baraldi & Ratajczak-Mrozek, 2019; Öberg, Huge-Brodin, & Björklund, 
2012). 
Against this backdrop, the business network literature showcases 
numerous accounts of pressure. On the one hand, firms that successfully 
respond to pressure do so through “indirect counterpart inclusion” in 
which the focal firm is able to compare, discuss and alter strategies with 
both closer and more distant firms in the business network (Harrison, 
Holmen, & Pedersen, 2010). On the other hand, less successful outcomes 
in response to pressure seem to arise in situations where there has been a 
failure of cooperation and trust between buyers and their multi-tier 
suppliers (Öberg, 2010). Pressure can also result in negative outcomes 
where buyers attempt to fully control their direct suppliers and sub- 
suppliers (Baraldi, Proença, Proença, & de Castro, 2014) and are more 
likely to materialize when a focal firm attempts to benefit unilaterally 
from a relationship rather than seeking to mutually benefit both parties 
(Abrahamsen & Håkansson, 2016). 
Significantly, the ability of a focal firm to exert influence over closer 
or more distant firms is contingent upon its ability to garner support 
from them, which is higher when their relationships are strong and 
rooted in trust (Andersson & Mölleryd, 1999; Öberg, 2010; Talay, 
Oxborrow, & Brindley, 2018). If a focal firm gains an advantage at the 
expense of its closer or more distant firms, however, its relationships 
with those firms will inevitably deteriorate (Baraldi & Ratajczak- 
Mrozek, 2019; Welch & Wilkinson, 2005). This thus suggests that high 
levels of trust between firms could be an ideal, and potentially neces-
sary, condition for nomination. 
2.3. Synthesizing nominated procurement in SSCM 
Nominated procurement, as a concept, is similar to that of the second 
approach to compliance, introduced above (Alexander, 2020; Briscoe 
et al., 2004; Crespin-Mazet & Dontenwill, 2012; Villena & Gioia, 2018). 
It, however, differs in that direct – horizontal or vertical – relationships 
are not established merely for the sake of sub-supplier compliance. As 
illustrated by business network research, indirectness is rather con-
nected with expected consequences for both direct and indirect re-
lationships (Anderson et al., 1994). The very idea of nominated 
procurement – buyers selecting sub-suppliers based on their own eval-
uations, while demanding that their direct suppliers source from them – 
emphasizes pressure as a proactive force which manifests in the selec-
tion of the sub-suppliers. 
Previous research related to the second network-based approach to 
compliance, which focuses on the direct relationships established be-
tween buyer and sub-supplier, demonstrates that such arrangements can 
lead to higher levels of sub-supplier trust (Foerstl et al., 2015; Mena 
et al., 2013), mutual stewardship (Assländer et al., 2016), higher levels 
of compliance, and also corrective actions (Grimm et al., 2016; Tachi-
zawa & Wong, 2014). Sub-suppliers benefit from a stable stream of 
production orders from direct suppliers, and are thereby incentivized to 
ensure compliance (Linton, Klassen, & Jayaraman, 2007; Nath, Eweje, & 
Bathurst, 2019; Villena & Gioia, 2018). 
The establishment of direct relationships between sub-suppliers and 
buyer is, however, different from nominated procurement. Nominated 
procurement in relation to direct suppliers and sub-suppliers has rarely 
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been researched in distanced emerging economy settings (Foerstl et al., 
2015; Grimm et al., 2016, 2018; Leppelt et al., 2013; Mena et al., 2013). 
Studying nominated procurement in the apparel supply chain of 
emerging economies, specifically, is of particularly high practical rele-
vance because of the substantial environmental and social problems 
related to the apparel industry in these economies (Ponte & Cheyns, 
2013; Talay et al., 2018; Turker & Altuntas, 2014). Furthermore, the 
consequences of nominated procurement on other firms in the supply 
chain, including not only direct suppliers but also raw-material sup-
pliers, are unknown. Fig. 1 compares the traditional approach with 
nominated procurement as a means of managing sub-supplier 
compliance. 
3. Research methods 
This research employs a qualitative, explorative, and inductive 
methodology, grounded empirically in the apparel supply chain of Sri 
Lanka. Qualitative inductive research is suitable in distilling theory from 
nascent concepts, and in tracking previously unidentified relationships 
that are distinctive or sensitive (Eisenhardt, Graebner, & Sonenshein, 
2016), such as compliance in apparel supply chains (Soundararajan & 
Brammer, 2018). Hence, the aim in employing this methodology is to 
investigate the phenomenon in its natural setting, delving into the causal 
mechanisms of nominated procurement from a single industry sample 
(Yin, 2003). 
3.1. The empirical stage: Linking the Sri Lankan apparel supply chain 
with SSCM research 
The Sri Lanka apparel supply chain represents an environment in 
which nominated procurement is widely adopted and is deemed a best 
practice example of compliance in South Asia (Jayasinghe, 2016; Kele-
gama, 2009; Ruwanpura & Wrigley, 2011). After a civil war that 
devastated the country for over 30 years, Sri Lanka has become a success 
story. Its annual economic growth of about 5.6 percent between 2010 
and 2018 has helped Sri Lanka curb extreme poverty and has enhanced 
its status as one of the most advanced emerging economies in South Asia 
for health, education, and social protection (World Bank, 2019). 
Crucially, its economic prowess has been supported by its export- 
oriented apparel supply chain, which reached US$5 billion turnover in 
2018 (Sri Lanka Apparel, 2019). Although it maintains similar labor and 
production costs to other manufacturing centers in South Asia (Athu-
korala & Ekanayake, 2018; Perry, Wood, & Fernie, 2015), the Sri Lanka 
apparel supply chain has gained a reputation for its ethical production 
practices. This is predominantly thanks to its compliance efforts (Kele-
gama, 2009), which include “promoting and protecting ethical labor 
standards” (Ruwanpura & Wrigley, 2011:1031). Industry-wide initia-
tives such as “Garments without Guilt,” supported by local apparel as-
sociations, have substantially contributed to integrating compliance in 
its apparel supply chain (Ruwanpura, 2016). While numerous accounts 
subscribe to the general view that Sri Lanka is a premium manufacturing 
hub where buyers “pay higher prices” for its ethics (Jayasinghe, 
2016:664), other narratives caution that the ethical engagement of its 
multi-tier suppliers may be under pressure, as they compete on low 
prices that “play a vital part in winning the order” (Pathirana & Heen-
kenda, 2011:84). Ruwanpura and Wrigley (2011), for instance, have 
redefined the apparel supply chain in Sri Lanka as a contentious field 
because multi-tier suppliers suffer from low remuneration, which may 
potentially result in compliance breaches. 
While endorsing the literature that argues that South Asian countries 
are fundamental contexts to observe the implementation of compliance 
through buyer–supplier relations (Awan, Kraslawski, & Huiskonen, 
2018a; Awan, Kraslawski, Huiskonen, & Suleman, 2020; Awan & 
Sroufe, 2020), this article contends that the Sri Lankan apparel supply 
chain represents an optimal and timely field of inquiry for SSCM 
research to scrutinize nominated procurement. This is particularly so 
because of the contrasting debates related to its adoption in practice. 
3.2. Theoretical sampling 
The data collected for this article predominantly comprises in-
terviews, complemented by participatory observations, notes, and visual 
material (informant sketches), all reinforced by continuous informal 
conversations over time. To increase the rigor and internal validity of 
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Fig. 1. Traditional approach and nomination.  
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First, and in line with Ketokivi and Choi (2014:234) call to perform 
fieldwork in SSCM research that “pays heed to contextual idiosyn-
crasies,” only Sri Lankan natives operating in the Sri Lankan knitwear 
(apparel) and export-oriented supply chain were recruited. In order to 
ensure that the informants were physically reachable, they were located 
solely within the capital, Colombo, or within two hours’ drive from the 
city. 
Second, recruitment focused on senior managers with extensive 
professional experience and decision-making influence because of the 
research intention to capture the rhetoric and organizational viewpoint 
on nominated procurement. This follows Awan et al. (2018a) method-
ological point that senior managers are particularly suitable for studies 
on the implementation of compliance, given their deep knowledge of 
buyer–supplier relationships. Hence, informants operated both in situ 
within their own organization and with collaborating organizations. 
Third, the study only included informants open to having ongoing 
informal conversations and follow-up inquiries after the initial inter-
view, as fieldwork compels “moving back and forth between inductive, 
open-ended encounters to more hypothetical-deductive attempts” (Pat-
ton, 2002:274). 
Finally, and as noted in Fig. 2, the study recruited only informants 
from organizations (buyers, direct suppliers, nominated sub-suppliers 
and NGOs) operating as part of the same apparel supply chain. Buyer 
1 and Buyer 2 nominated the same sub-suppliers and used the same 
direct suppliers. Likewise, the NGOs involved cooperated with these 
same sub-suppliers and direct suppliers to ascertain compliance. This 
elucidates Baraldi et al. (2014) point on the salience of capturing the 
perspectives of all parties to ensure bipartisanship, while also drawing 
boundaries to ensure that only informants with active and existing 
business exchanges are selected. For instance, five additional interviews 
were conducted with five informants from two additional direct sup-
pliers in Sri Lanka, but these interviews were later excluded as these 
direct suppliers did not work with the buyers and sub-suppliers selected. 
This decision follows Eisenhardt et al. (2016) point that a qualitative 
lens on a narrow and coherent set of informants, rather than a large 
sample of data points, helps generate deeper insights for theory building. 
Buyer 1 and Buyer 2 are two major clothing brands. While head-
quartered in the United States and the United Kingdom respectively, 
they are globally renowned for lingerie and womenswear. The three 
direct suppliers in this study are among the largest employers in Sri 
Lanka and are often defined as the country’s pioneers in apparel 
manufacturing. Each of them has a strict compliance agenda and has 
been exporting globally for decades. Although the sub-suppliers are 
much smaller in size and capacity, they pride themselves on delivering 
complex designs and customized finishing while complying with mini-
mum environmental and social standards, and on offering job oppor-
tunities outside Colombo. NGOs 1 and 2 operate locally with sub- 
suppliers and direct suppliers to ensure worker well-being and to 
monitor environmental pollution. Interviewing two leading NGO senior 
managers involved in SSCM cooperation with all of the multi-tier sup-
pliers of the sample was pivotal in increasing objectivity and validating 
results (Crespin-Mazet & Dontenwill, 2012; Pagell & Wu, 2009; Ponte & 
Cheyns, 2013). 
3.3. Data collection 
The data collection process was divided into four stages. During the 
initial stage in Spring 2016, 15 informants were contacted via e-mail and 
telephone after searching their contact information online. Five of them 
agreed to respond and formed the first pilot sample. They were offered 
data confidentiality and non-disclosure as part of the ethics of the 
research process. All informants were given a description of the project 
themes and were asked candidly whether they felt they could discuss 
these themes, given their professional role. 
The pilot sample was interviewed as part of the second stage in July 
2016. In line with Awan, Kraslawski, and Huiskonen (2018b), the first 
interviews were key in order to test and further develop the interview 
protocol. It was particularly important for the research to then access 
additional informants from organizations within the same supply chain. 
The snowballing method was fundamental in finding another 10 in-
formants from direct suppliers, buyers, nominated sub-suppliers, and 
NGOs. In total, 15 interviews were completed, including one visit and 
participatory observation at a direct supplier’s manufacturing facility. 
At this stage, the first author had access to the professional community 
of Colombo, attending NGO programs and events involving senior 
















Nomination Buyer 2 – Sub-suppliers 1, 2, 3 (pressure)
NGO1
NGO2
Merchandise flow (from upstream to downstream)
Fig. 2. Network of organizations.  
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The third stage took place between early 2017 and late 2018 and 
focused on elaborating upon the data already collected. This stage 
involved informal follow-up contact with informants via e-mail and 
phone to discuss the authors’ inferences and information that may have 
been sidelined during the interviews. While conducting one additional 
interview with one informant, this stage allowed the authors to hint at 
preliminary conclusions. 
During the fourth and final stage of the research in December 2018, 
five additional interviews were completed. Three nominated sub- 
supplier facilities were also visited, and the results were discussed 
with some of the informants previously interviewed in 2016. As part of 
these interviews, the informants were asked to draw on paper their 
thoughts on nominated procurement, helping visualize the study results. 
During this period, the third author attended a SSCM-focused event near 
Colombo, meeting with senior managers and academics. Theoretical 
saturation was reached at the end of the fourth stage (Guest, Bunce, & 
Johnson, 2006). 
As illustrated in Table 1, 20 in-depth and open-ended interviews 
were conducted with an eclectic group comprising 18 informants from 
10 distinct organizations. The interviews comprised three informants 
working for three buyers, 10 informants from three direct suppliers, 
three informants from three nominated sub-suppliers, and two in-
formants from two non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Nineteen 
of these interviews were conducted formally and face-to-face in Sri 
Lanka during 2016 and 2018, and were discussed among the authors 
before and after their completion. One interview was conducted via 
video conference to accommodate the informant’s schedule. 
Additional and ongoing informal conversations with all informants 
were conducted via e-mail and phone after their interviews between the 
second and fourth stage of the research process. These were salient to 
reinforce and validate results over time, particularly concerning the 
consequences of nominated procurement on the supply chain. These 
conversations were also important to communicate the emerging results 
to the informants who affect and are affected by nominated procurement 
in their everyday business activities and who expressed a desire to 
remain updated about the research process. 
The interview protocol comprised open-ended and semi-structured 
questions (Appendix 1) designed to garner informants’ rhetoric and 
understand their motivations (Patton, 2002). The interviews were con-
ducted formally on a one-to-one basis in English and lasted, on average, 
74 min – from a minimum of 40 min to a maximum of 135 min, 
excluding informal discussions. Four manufacturing facilities were 
accessed, one belonging to a direct supplier and three belonging to three 
nominated sub-suppliers. In line with Patton (2002), the authors stayed 
at the factory for most of the day of the visit. They conducted partici-
patory observations, had lunch with the factory management, and 
openly discussed ideas with them. 
3.4. Data analysis 
All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. Gioia, Corley, 
and Hamilton (2013) method was adopted to analyze the data, as it 
ensures the rigor of the qualitative analysis and builds on Corbin and 
Strauss (2008) notions of open coding and axial coding. The transcripts 
were read by the authors multiple times in an iterative fashion. This 
iterative process helped identify nascent ideas and specific themes, 
which were manually coded, reread, and imported into a customized 
Microsoft Excel file tailored to register the authors’ evolving in-
terpretations of the data and experiences on the topic, linking them with 
the nascent codes as a means of comparing and contrasting the ideas and 
themes. 
Given the attention on nominated procurement and compliance, the 
analysis was conducted within the space created through these two 
frames, as guided by the interview protocol. In line with induction in 
qualitative studies, however, the authors focused on all possible re-
sponses for the step-by-step development of codes and themes in the 
analysis. 
The interview data were systematically supplemented and triangu-
lated with a rich amount of additional information in order to improve 
theory building and congruence (Flick, 2004). This additional data 
included handwritten notes and memos taken during the interviews, 
informal conversations, e-mail correspondence, participatory observa-
tions at the manufacturing facilities, available annual sustainability re-
ports for all of the direct suppliers and buyers involved in the study for 
the past five years, material collected from SSCM events, and confer-
ences attended during the fieldwork, as well as the visual sketches 
created by the informants. Field notes also included the authors’ positive 
and negative feelings experienced during the interviews and visits. 
As illustrated in the data structure (Fig. 3), the data process analysis 
unfolded through a granular and three-step methodology (Patton, 
2002), which involved open coding, axial coding (theoretical codes, 
Eisenhardt et al., 2016), and formation of aggregate dimensions. Open 
coding was first conducted to unpack the first-order concepts. This 
involved tracking the empirical accounts while strictly adhering to the 
informants’ explicit terms, disclosed through their rhetoric (Gioia et al., 
2013). Commonalities and discrepancies among first-order concepts 
Table 1 
Sample of organizations and respondents.  
Type Name Emp- 
loyees 
Respondent Interview location Interview date # 
Clothing brands as international Buyer 1 (US origin) 20k+ Director of Merchandising Colombo City (Main office) Jul 2016 1 
customers (ICs)   Division Manager of Raw Materials Colombo City (Main office) Dec 2016 2  
Buyer 2 (UK origin) 28k+ Human Resource Director Colombo City (Main office) Jul 2016 3 
Direct (first-tier) Direct supplier 1 40k+ Group Head of Supply Chain Colombo City (Headquarters) Jul 2016 4 
suppliers    Colombo City (Headquarters) Dec 2018 5    
Head of Sustainable Development Colombo City (Headquarters) Jul 2016 6     
Video conference Jan 2018 7    
Head Corporate Planning Colombo City (Headquarters) Jul 2016 8    
Chief Financial Officer Colombo City (Headquarters) Jul 2016 9  
Direct supplier 2 90k+ Human Resource Director Colombo City (Headquarters) Jul 2016 10    
Director of Environmental Sustainability Colombo Outskirts (Outer Facility) Jul 2016 11    
Environmental Engineer Colombo Outskirts (Outer Facility) Jul 2016 12    
General Manager Panadura Area (Factory) Jul 2016 13    
Product Manager Panadura Area (Factory) Jul 2016 14  
Direct supplier 3 100k+ Environmental Manager Colombo City (Headquarters) Jul 2016 15 
Nominated (second- Sub- supplier 1 1k+ General Manager Horana Area (Factory) Jul 2016 16 
tier) sub-suppliers Sub- supplier 2 1k+ Chief Operating Officer Pugoda Area (Factory) Dec 2018 17  
Sub- supplier 3 2k+ Sales and Marketing Manager Malwana Area (Factory) Dec 2018 18 
Non-governmental NGO1 N.A. Chief Executive Officer Colombo City (Headquarters) July 2016 19 
organizations NGO2 N.A. Country Director Colombo City (Headquarters) July 2016 20  
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were considered, in association with the focus on nominated procure-
ment. Open codes were grouped together in more defined and 
manageable groups, reducing the number of first-order concepts (Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008). Over 50 first-order code category concepts were 
compiled through this step. 
While trying to interpret the nascent theoretical models, axial coding 
was conducted to capture firmer second-order theoretical themes. For 
instance, in yielding the second-order and abstract theme “Sandwiching 
of direct suppliers,” the analysis built on the first-order descriptive 
concepts that indicated the difficult “in-between” position of direct 
suppliers vis-á-vis buyers and sub-suppliers. These included, for 
instance, “direct suppliers’ squeezing between nominated sub-suppliers 
and buyers,” and “direct suppliers’ reputational and economic tensions.” 
In the final step, the axial coding procedure linked back to the two 
main themes of this article framed through the research questions 
(articulation of nominated procurement and supply chain consequences, 
respectively). While codes were produced as first-order and axial codes, 
the presentation of findings in this article returns to the data and uses 
direct quotations as a means to convey direct meanings from the 
disparate perspectives of buyers, direct suppliers, sub-suppliers, and 
NGOs. 
Following the coding process, the authors discussed final coding 
structures and presented preliminary findings to peer researchers in 
order to verify the meanings. Conclusions were juxtaposed with prior 
research to corroborate the research gap and theoretical contributions. 
4. Empirical findings 
The findings presented in this section are organized around the two 
main themes related to the research questions and indicated in Fig. 3: 
Articulation of nominated procurement and Consequences of nominated 
procurement. 
4.1. Articulation of nominated procurement 
Buyers’ articulation of nominated procurement strictly hinges on 
how they organize for sub-supplier compliance in the supply chain, 
where compliance pressure represents the key idea of the nomination. 
This initially emerged as the buyers selected sub-suppliers for the 
nomination, based on their ability to fulfill and maintain compliance 
requirements. The Director of Merchandising at Buyer 1 expressed this 
as follows: “We nominate the sub-supplier factories with the highest 
compliance, quality standards and ethics.” After an initial screening, the 
buyers routinely audited the sub-suppliers. This means that compliance 
pressure also entailed expectations about accessing the factories and 
questioning compliance: “We have a compliance officer who goes around. 
Even the printing plants are evaluated and monitored. For all requirements, 
like eco-friendly and weekly checks, they have to be compliant” (Director of 
Merchandising, Buyer 1) and “we have a compliance team, and they 
collaborate with the nominated sub-supplier base. They are on top of it” 
(Human Resource Director, Buyer 2). Compliance pressure on the sub- 
suppliers materialized most evidently after selection, as they needed 
to constantly demonstrate that they fulfilled the compliance re-
quirements in order to retain the nomination: “We are audited for various 
1st Order Concepts (Open coding) 2nd Order Themes (Axial Coding) Aggregate Dimensions
Suboptimal Compliance 














- Buyer commercial control over nominated sub-
suppliers
- Nominated sub-supplier prioritization based on prices,
production times and quality
Sandwiching of 
direct suppliers
- Increased geographical competition
- Buyers’ international benchmarking of nominated sub-
suppliers
- Sub-supplier compliance as imperative for the
nomination
- Buyer focus on compliance audits for nominated sub-
suppliers
- Outsourcing responsibility of raw material supplier
compliance
- Weak link between sub-supplier nomination and raw
material supplier compliance
- Nominated sub-suppliers’ selection of raw material
suppliers based on margins, geography and reputation
- Buyers’ bounded understanding of raw material
supplier compliance
- Direct suppliers’ squeezing between nominated sub-
suppliers and buyers
- Direct suppliers’ reputational and economic tensions
Fig. 3. Data structure.  
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compliance requirements from [buyers] to get nominated and keep the 
nomination. Practically, every customer does its own audit […] If you are not 
compliant it is hard to do any business” (Chief Operating Officer, Sub- 
Supplier 2). Crucially, the pressure to be compliant prompted the 
nominated sub-suppliers to make substantial investments in order to 
make sure that they retained the nomination and continued to be 
regarded as a facility of “excellence.” As stated by the Country Director 
at NGO2: “Nominated [sub-supplier] factories in Sri Lanka are top notch. 
They have high safety measurements. Compliance is extremely high. This is 
the one thing about many Sri Lankan sub-suppliers. If you don’t have 
compliance you cannot work with [buyers].” 
However, the emphasis on compliance emerged as only one of 
several aspects of buyers’ articulation of nomination procurement. The 
buyers also exerted geographical pressure in their decision to select sub- 
suppliers and maintain their nomination. However, they utilized mar-
ket locations of production as a condition to consolidate their power. 
The buyers demanded that nominated sub-suppliers in Sri Lanka guar-
antee the same or superior conditions of sub-suppliers in other Asian 
regions. By selecting sub-suppliers purposely in Sri Lanka, in the same 
time, the buyers exerted peer pressure because of the country’s repu-
tation of excellence. This also means that buyers expected compliance 
based on sub-supplier location. By exerting geographical pressure, the 
buyers obliged nominated sub-suppliers to continuously benchmark 
their product offerings with those of other nominated sub-suppliers but 
also non-nominated sub-suppliers in other Asian regions. This stoked 
competition between sub-suppliers, putting them under continuous 
strain. As the Chief Operating Officer at Sub-Supplier 2, emphasized: 
“The challenge of nomination is competition, because [buyers] are 
approached by Singaporean, Chinese and other countries’ [sub] suppliers, in 
terms of communication and relationship building […] There are buyers we 
cannot dream of getting nominated from. Their prices are so low that only 
Pakistani or Bangladeshi [sub-supplier] factories can handle them.” 
This last quotation shines a spotlight on a third aspect of nominated 
procurement: How the buyers utilized compliance as a pretext to 
encourage sub-suppliers to reduce prices. While advancing compliance 
arguments, they exerted commercial pressure on sub-suppliers in order to 
gain a business advantage. Commercial pressure encompassed not only 
price pressure but also the speed of delivery and quality of goods, as 
expressed by the Environmental Manager at Direct Supplier 3: “When 
[buyers] nominate sub-suppliers, it is not really for compliance. Quality, on 
time delivery, and price. These are three areas that the apparel [buyers] are 
looking at, without any conditions. Compliance as environmental and social 
engagement, it comes next.” 
Both buyers and sub-suppliers alike corroborated the existence of 
commercial pressure at the foundation of nominated procurement, as 
the following quotations illustrates: “price benefits and speed benefits are 
of utmost priority when negotiating the nomination” (Division Manager of 
Raw Materials, Buyer 1) and: “from nominated sub-suppliers, we look for 
high reliability. This means time delivery, price and quality service. There are 
lots of quality standards we maintain. We are very particular about lines and 
stitching has to be perfect. Everything has to be perfect” (Human Resource 
Director, Buyer 2). Likewise, the General Manager, Sub-Supplier 1 
pointed out that providing lower prices, faster deliveries, and higher 
quality goods was not only necessary for being selected for nomination 
but was imperative in maintaining nominated sub-supplier status: “to 
maintain the nomination, for each and every order, [buyers] want to see a 
discount. Every time you have to decrease the price. So, the margin is 
decreasing. With certain products we are working at a loss. This is the trend.” 
Subsequently, buyers used surveillance tactics on sub-suppliers to 
encourage price reductions, which the buyers then expected sub- 
suppliers to pass on to the direct suppliers, thus resulting in lower pri-
ces for buyers. Moreover, the prioritization of price over compliance was 
decisive for selecting and maintaining nominated sub-suppliers. While 
commercial pressure was much about continuous price reductions, 
compliance pressure was more about achieving expected levels of 
compliance. 
The buyers also exerted geographical and commercial pressure in 
combination, as described by the Division Manager of Raw Materials at 
Buyer 1: “When it comes to nomination I ask, can you [nominated sub- 
supplier] in Sri Lanka give me the same price as my nominated [sub] sup-
pliers in Vietnam at the same or better quality? If yes, then I keep considering 
you. Sometimes I go to nominated [sub] suppliers in other regions and ask, 
can you reduce your price? Because I have someone else giving me a lower 
price in Sri Lanka.” Whether a threat or an actual intention, this quote 
illustrates that the buyers did not consider sub-suppliers as collaborators 
with whom to establish long-term nominations. The distrust that exists 
between buyers and sub-suppliers arose from the buyers’ unrelenting 
focus on negotiating prices and their use of surveillance practices to 
ensure compliance, thereby increasing sub-suppliers’ perceived risk of 
being de-selected at any time. 
As part of their articulation of nominated procurement, the buyers 
also exerted extended compliance pressure with the aim of making sub- 
suppliers accountable for the compliance of their raw material sup-
pliers and accomplishing compliance along the supply chain: “Our 
nominated sub-suppliers have to have compliance certificates. We will not go 
and evaluate their yarn and chemical [raw material] suppliers. The re-
sponsibility for [raw material] supplier compliance is important but lies with 
each and every nominated sub-supplier.” (Division Manager of Raw Ma-
terials, Buyer 1). Hence, buyers delegated all responsibilities pertaining 
to raw material supplier compliance to nominated sub-suppliers. By 
framing them as “important but noncompulsory” (Director, Merchan-
dising, Buyer 1), the buyers however assigned low priority to raw ma-
terial supplier compliance when deciding upon nomination and did not 
always conduct follow up checks on such compliance. As epitomized by 
the Human Resource Director at Buyer 2: “I have no idea whether they 
[raw material suppliers] really do compliance work. We tell [nominated sub- 
suppliers] they should check. But we don’t nominate sub-suppliers based on 
that.” 
In summary, and as indicated in Fig. 3, the buyers articulated 
nominated procurement in terms of exerting compliance, geographical, 
commercial, and extended compliance pressure. This articulation em-
phasizes that nomination was not solely based on achieving compliance 
and – as reflected in the discussion of extended compliance and the 
explanation that commercial gains were of more importance than 
compliance – they indicate that sustainability concerns were partly 
utilized to achieve further objectives. The result of the nomination 
criteria and process on sub-suppliers was continuous distrust of the 
buyers and a perceived risk of being replaced, reflecting not only the 
buyers’ need to assure compliance but also the price pressure exerted on 
the sub-suppliers. 
4.2. Consequences of nominated procurement 
As noted above, the buyers did not require nominated sub-suppliers 
to share any compliance certificate for raw material suppliers. Conse-
quently, the nominated sub-suppliers did not ask for them: “If your 
company wants to survive in this competition and win the nomination, you 
should have a very good margin from the [raw material] supplier, no matter 
what. Most raw materials are yarn. Yarn takes 50% of your costs. To 
minimize costs, we order from Thailand, China, and India.” (General 
Manager, Sub-supplier 1). And: “[Buyers] will tell us the standards, and we 
can purchase from anyone [raw material supplier]. We manage our own raw 
materials, but [buyers] don’t check. We then buy from India. We buy from 
Korea. China. Indonesia. And as long as the [minimum] quality test passes, 
it’s ok” (Sales and Marketing Manager, Sub-supplier 3). As these quo-
tations indicate, suboptimal compliance appeared to be aggravated by 
buyers’ commercial and geographical pressure on nominated sub- 
suppliers and buyers’ lack of focus on the compliance of raw material 
suppliers. This resulted in nominated sub-suppliers searching for raw 
material suppliers in other Asian regions offering the lowest price, 
irrespective of compliance. The importance of compliance in relation to 
social conditions was notably minimized, as the Director of 
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Merchandising at Buyer 1 hinted: “We actually don’t look for social 
compliance as a qualification to do business with us.” This was confirmed by 
the Chief Operating Officer at Sub-Supplier 2: “We don’t get into the social 
side at all. [Buyers] inquire about our compliance as nominated [sub] sup-
pliers. But they don’t check our [raw material] suppliers and their social 
activities. We also do not go and check the social compliance they have done. 
Not only us. Nobody does it, all over the apparel supply chain.” The unclear 
expectations of raw material supplier compliance along the supply chain 
resulted in suboptimal compliance. These vague expectations them-
selves were a result of buyers’ commercial pressure and their limited 
interest in following up on extended compliance. 
Although the nomination of sub-suppliers led to supply chain con-
sequences upstream in the supply chain, it also led to consequences in 
relation to direct suppliers: The direct suppliers became sandwiched or 
squeezed because of their intermediary position between their buyers 
and nominated sub-suppliers. As conceptualized in this article, sand-
wiching emerges when buyers exclude their direct suppliers from taking 
part in decisions regarding the nomination of sub-suppliers. This 
affected the direct suppliers in two ways: They perceived sandwiching as 
raising their reputational risk, since they were not able to co-manage 
compliance upstream in the supply chain; and they also perceived a 
commercial risk, as they were excluded from participating in the selection 
of sub-suppliers, thereby missing out on key economic opportunities. 
In considering the reputational risk attached to a possible breach in 
compliance, the Director of Environmental Sustainability at Direct 
Supplier 2 explained that: “[Buyers] purchase from us as sustainable 
[direct] suppliers. Then they independently nominate [sub-]suppliers that 
source from noncompliant [raw material] suppliers. The problem is that not 
everyone is on the same playing field and our reputation is at stake.” The 
Environmental Manager at Direct Supplier 3 similarly stated that: 
“[Buyers] show they are sourcing from Sri Lanka, the most sustainable 
apparel hubs in Asia. In fact, chemicals go into the environment through 
uncontrolled [raw material] suppliers in China and other countries, which 
work with nominated sub-suppliers here. We are risking our face because of 
them.” 
The reputational risk was also highlighted by NGOs: “In the apparel 
sector, you have huge problems with uncontrolled [raw material] suppliers. 
This system leads you to commit sins - because yarns [raw materials] come 
from outside. You tailor them here, you export them. The nominated apparel 
[sub-suppliers] invest in countries where they can get benefits rather than 
compliance, and buyers don’t seem to mind” (CEO, NGO 1). As a result, the 
de-prioritized compliance was perceived to be unambiguously prob-
lematic, while the direct suppliers also expressed concerns about the 
sub-suppliers. 
As for the second – commercial – risk, the direct suppliers felt 
impotent to take action and that the buyers were squeezing their eco-
nomic opportunities: “The problem is that negotiation, planning, and 
sourcing are done exclusively by buyers and nominated sub-suppliers. Buyers 
nominate sub-suppliers and tell them, ‘We are buying this much, and I want 
you to deliver it to the [direct] suppliers at this cost. I am going to give them 
this much.’ Then they tell us, ‘Source these textiles from these nominated 
[sub] suppliers.’ Commercially, we are excluded” (Head of Supply Chain 
Management, Direct Supplier 1). This was echoed by the Director of 
Environmental Sustainability at Direct Supplier 2: “Transparency has just 
started but our buyers and nominated [sub-]suppliers keep their decisions 
about nomination and their [raw material] suppliers very secret. They don’t 
disclose them. This puts us in an inferior commercial position.” 
The buyers, in turn, clarified their view on the matter as follows: 
“They [direct suppliers] always come to us saying ‘We would like to nominate 
our own [sub-]suppliers.’ We specify that we don’t nominate for their 
strategy. We nominate for our strategy […] [Direct] suppliers get only their 
picture. They prefer to work with the [sub] suppliers from which they get their 
own market benefits” (Division Manager, Raw Materials, Buyer 1). 
5. Discussion 
Traditional SSCM research has shown that buyers ensure supply 
chain compliance by either holding direct suppliers accountable for sub- 
suppliers or establishing direct relationships with parties further up-
stream in the supply chain to create network structures of common 
norms (Mena et al., 2013; Tachizawa & Wong, 2014; Wilhelm, Blome, 
Bhakoo, et al., 2016). These schemes have brought limited results, while 
the natural environment and people continue to suffer, not least when 
production is outsourced to emerging economies. As sub-supplier 
compliance remains a critical feature of supply chains (Grimm et al., 
2018; Soundararajan & Brammer, 2018; Villena & Gioia, 2018), this 
article advances SSCM scholarship by describing and discussing nomi-
nated procurement as a novel approach. This article elucidates how 
nominated procurement is articulated by buyers in their selection of sub- 
suppliers. It highlights the indirectness of parties and the existence of 
different types of pressure as proactive measures (Walker et al., 2008; 
Wycherley, 1999) to officially encourage sub-supplier compliance, 
while extending the focus to consider the accountability of raw material 
suppliers. As the findings indicate, sub-supplier nomination has under-
lying consequences for the entire supply chain, including raw material 
suppliers, sub-suppliers, and direct suppliers, which clearly extend 
beyond compliance. Fig. 4 depicts the types of pressure and conse-
quences that are further discussed below. 
5.1. Pressure exerted by buyers in the supply chain 
While framing nomination as the pressure placed by buyers on sub- 
suppliers, the findings outline four types of pressure:  
• Compliance pressure manifests when buyers require sub-suppliers to 
meet compliance standards as the official motive to gain and retain 
the nomination. This pressure can be defined as static because it 
relates to minimum requirements and creates a threshold for selec-
tion. In the buyers’ continued request for sub-supplier compliance 
reassurance, this pressure also involves aspects of reactive control 
and fuels a sense of transactional distrust between buyer and sub- 
supplier. 
• Geographical pressure relates to buyers taking advantage of the dis-
tance between buyers and sub-suppliers in order to stoke competi-
tion between the nominated and non-nominated sub-suppliers in 
different geographical areas, while also using the reputation of Sri 
Lanka as a context to ensure compliance among the selected sub- 
suppliers. Compared to compliance pressure, the selection is here 
based on the country’s reputation of excellence for compliance. In 
contrast, the continuation of the nomination is achieved through 
peer-pressure and by threatening the nominated sub-supplier with 
de-selection based on comparison with alternative sub-suppliers.  
• Commercial pressure arises as a means for buyers to achieve financial 
advantages and increase profitability. This is a dynamic pressure, as 
buyers exert increasing and continuous pressure for reductions in 
price. As such, commercial pressure involves aspects of geographical 
pressure in that the ability to deliver on requested price is linked to 
geographical parameters.  
• Extended compliance pressure emerges as an extension of the 
accountability that buyers place on their sub-suppliers to ensure raw 
material supplier compliance. This pressure is indirect because it 
exerts pressure on sub-suppliers to be accountable for parties up-
stream in the supply chain. Despite its de-prioritization, extended 
compliance pressure also relates to commercial pressure, because the 
risk of non-compliance among raw material suppliers increases when 
sub-suppliers need to keep delivering price reductions. 
In uncovering these different types of pressure, the findings 
demonstrate that buyers do not articulate nominated procurement, in 
terms of the achievement of sub-supplier compliance as the sole purpose 
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and as officially posited. Although studies have shown that pressure has 
positive effects on compliance (Preuss, 2007; Zhu & Sarkis, 2006; Zhu 
et al., 2007) the findings discussed in this article suggest that such 
positive outcomes may not extend beyond sub-supplier compliance, 
because the parties are not able to establish a trusting relationship 
(Andersson & Mattsson, 2010; Baraldi et al., 2019). Instead, these pos-
itive outcomes are a consequence of the ways in which compliance 
pressure becomes interwoven with, and even subordinate to, other types 
of pressure. For instance, the sub-suppliers openly recognize the com-
mercial and geographical pressure exerted by buyers to ensure lower 
prices and competitive conditions as an overt attempt by the buyers to 
take advantage of the nomination. Moreover, the risk of being replaced 
by another sub-supplier defines nomination as a here-and-now situation 
that is not aimed at producing longevity in the relationship between 
parties. The findings show that nomination prevents the building of trust 
and increased tensions. This lack of trust resulted in sub-suppliers taking 
advantage of the lower priority assigned by buyers to raw material 
supplier compliance, thereby undermining extended compliance pres-
sure and adding the risk of suboptimal compliance in the supply chain. 
In comparison with previous literature which suggests that compli-
ance generates tensions as well as trade-offs in benefits and costs 
(Goworek et al., 2018; Harwood & Humby, 2008; Karaosman et al., 
2018; Turker & Altuntas, 2014), this article illuminates how buyers 
actually exploit compliance requirements as a means to exert pressure 
for other outcomes. While aligning compliance with other types of 
pressure, this article thus shows how compliance requirements are 
manipulated in order to obtain instrumental benefits. This differs from 
seeking a trade-off between financial, environmental, and social goals, 
with tensions being distributed along the supply chain. 
5.2. Indirect supply chain consequences 
The findings identify two indirect supply chain consequences of 
nomination: Suboptimal compliance of raw material suppliers and 
sandwiched direct suppliers. Suboptimal compliance of raw material 
suppliers is the result of commercial pressure exerted by buyers and the 
limited attention paid to raw material supplier compliance. Sub- 
suppliers feel pressure to reduce prices and therefore cannot afford to 
select the most compliant raw material suppliers. This price pressure, in 
addition to the low priority given by buyers to raw material supplier 
compliance, results in suboptimal compliance. 
Sandwiching, as conceptualized in this article, describes how nomi-
nation can extend beyond pressuring sub-suppliers. Through their se-
lection of sub-suppliers, buyers can de facto squeeze direct suppliers, 
which sit in an intermediary supply chain position between the sub- 
suppliers and buyers. Such sandwiching promotes further instability, 
tension, and distrust in the supply chain, while having consequences for 
the reputational and commercial efforts of direct suppliers. This finding 
supports the notion of interconnectivity of parties, as expressed in 
business network research (Andersson & Mölleryd, 1999). As explained 
by both direct suppliers and sub-suppliers, reputational risks at the level 
of the individual firm could potentially risk the country’s reputation for 
compliance excellence. Arguably, the reputational risk is already high, 
given that sub-suppliers feel compelled to source raw materials from 
other countries due to the continuous pressure for lower and lower 
prices. Reputational risk was noted as a concern by the direct suppliers 
and is related to the geographical and commercial pressure exerted by 
buyers and negatively corresponds to compliance and extended 
compliance pressure given their lower priority. As a result, the com-
mercial risk perceived by direct suppliers results from buyers’ com-
mercial pressure of sub-suppliers and their own gains. Hence, this article 
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Fig. 4. Pressure and consequences.  
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6. Conclusions 
This article describes and discusses nominated procurement as a 
means to achieve compliance upstream in emerging economies’ supply 
chains. The following questions were raised:  
(1) How do buyers articulate nominated procurement in an emerging 
economy supply chain?  
(2) What are the consequences of nominated procurement on the 
supply chain? 
Buyers articulate nominated procurement as involving four types of 
pressure: compliance, geographical, commercial, and extended 
compliance pressure. The impact on the supply chain of these pressures 
manifests as suboptimal compliance of raw material suppliers and the 
sandwiching of direct suppliers. Perhaps more significantly, these types 
of pressure and consequences are intertwined. It is evident that there is a 
complex pattern of interlinked pressures along the entire supply chain of 
raw material suppliers, sub-suppliers, direct suppliers, and buyers. The 
tensions between economic pressure and compliance pressure cause 
direct and indirect pressure along the supply chain. Although there is no 
direct business connection between the parties, the buyer exerts direct 
pressure on the sub-suppliers. This direct pressure passes on in the form of 
indirect pressure on raw material suppliers and direct suppliers, respec-
tively. The dynamic commercial pressure, camouflaged as compliance, 
generates distrust along the length of the supply chain and creates short- 
term and opportunistic orientations in all parties. 
7. Theoretical contributions 
This article identifies six central components of nominated pro-
curement: compliance pressure, commercial pressure, geographical 
pressure, extended compliance pressure, suboptimal compliance, and 
sandwiching. The combination of these components creates tensions 
among the parties along the supply chain and leads to distrust, reflected 
in behaviors that downplay compliance for instrumental gains. The 
theorizing of nominated procurement as a form of direct and indirect 
pressure – conflated with the complex interplay between different types 
of pressure, priorities, and supply chain consequences, which include 
suboptimal compliance and sandwiching – provides important contri-
butions to SSCM literature. It does so through unpacking the tangible 
advantages and challenges related to compliance (Crespin-Mazet & 
Dontenwill, 2012; Gadde & Jonsson, 2018; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). 
Employing accountability as the dominating approach for ensuring 
compliance (Foerstl et al., 2015; Grimm et al., 2016; Grimm et al., 2018; 
Soundararajan & Brammer, 2018) illustrates that compliance is inter-
woven with business exchanges and illuminates that actual compliance 
hinges on parties positioned elsewhere in the supply chain. Nomination 
allows buyers to take an active role upstream in the supply chain and 
disconnects compliance from direct business exchanges. This process 
helps to avoid what Choi and Linton (2011) describe as a loss of visibility 
and relieves direct suppliers from being exclusively accountable for the 
compliance of sub-suppliers (Wilhelm, Blome, Wieck, et al., 2016). That 
said, the gains of nomination include buyers’ attempts to take advantage 
of compliance to camouflage intentions related to commercial benefits, 
which poisons the supply chain with opportunism and distrust. When 
buyers aim to ensure compliance to the extent of overshadowing and 
excluding their direct suppliers, their pervasive commercial oppor-
tunism may put compliance and the whole supply chain in jeopardy. 
Although concurring with extant SSCM literature that postulates that a 
wider network structure can help deliver higher sub-supplier compli-
ance (Grimm et al., 2016), this article stresses that nominated pro-
curement does not necessarily lead to a higher degree of supply chain 
integration (Briscoe et al., 2004) and stewardship (Assländer et al., 
2016). This is because opportunism and the prioritization of commercial 
gains prevent the establishment of trust between the parties. 
This research makes three main contributions to the literature. While 
studies on compliance have gained momentum in the SSCM literature, 
nominated procurement has not been explicitly investigated in previous 
research. Perhaps more problematically, extant studies have only barely 
been situated in emerging economies as key settings of inquiry. By 
showing the various types of pressure inherent in the process of nomi-
nated procurement and the resulting consequences which extend 
beyond compliance, this study reveals a holistic picture of complex 
patterns between pressure and consequences that are experienced over 
the entire supply chain. Not least, it contributes to the advancement of 
SSCM literature by theorizing about nominated procurement. In so 
doing, it dras attention to suboptimal compliance along the supply 
chain, as well as conceptualizing sandwiching as a method used by 
buyers to squeeze direct suppliers as they select sub-suppliers. Finally, 
by discussing the tensions that may foster instability in the supply chain, 
this article draws attention to the need in SSCM literature to seek bal-
ance between compliance and business objectives, and the important of 
developing trust as a key component between parties in the supply 
chain. 
7.1. Implications for managerial practice 
Nominated procurement as a means to obtain instrumental gains 
results in suboptimal compliance upstream in supply chains, thereby 
engendering relational tensions, opportunism and risks of discontinuity. 
By describing and discussing nominated procurement, this article con-
veys fundamental guidelines for managers within buyer firms who 
source from apparel supply chains in emerging economies. The indi-
rectness of parties, interconnectivities of actors and interdependences 
noted by business network scholars emerging from the empirical evi-
dence presented in this article – as shown in Section 2.2 – highlight the 
problems of trust in supply chains. The pressure placed on raw material 
suppliers with regard to price, the ever-present risk of replacement 
experienced by sub-suppliers, the sandwiching of direct suppliers, and 
the commercial priorities of buyers severely inhibits any type of 
collaborative effort and, therefore, the generation of trust. Although 
business network research indicates that relational reciprocity replaces 
the need for auditing or surveillance of other parties, reciprocity does 
not crystallize if continuous and one-sided pressure continues to exist. 
Many of the current tensions, however, can be defused by reconfiguring 
nominated procurement as a more collaborative and balanced process 
where pressure is exchanged for trust without hindering it. This is a clear 
call to buyers’ managers to delegate part of their decision-making to 
direct suppliers in order to increase opportunities for generating trust 
along the entire supply chain. Furthermore, it is important for these 
managers to recognize that nominated procurement can be used as a 
method to encourage social and environmental accomplishments in the 
upstream apparel supply chain. The power of buyers can be used posi-
tively to develop balanced relationships and to improve trust between 
parties in the supply chain and, at the same time, to help supply chain 
firms nurture social and environmental activism from upstream. This 
entails a change in focus of current conversations in the literature, away 
from pressure, opportunism and compliance as minimum buyer stan-
dards, and towards encouraging sustainability innovation as a mecha-
nism to spearhead and co-create social and environmental solutions. 
While such a shift would inevitably benefit the Sri Lankan supply chain 
as a whole, it would also benefit buyers in a variety of ways. On the one 
hand, it would likely reduce buyers’ financial expenditures by 
decreasing the costs of ongoing controlling, policing and switching. On 
the other hand, it would likely enhance performance indicators. It could 
foster a stream of new ideas on sustainability innovation from upstream, 
thereby helping buyers enhance their international credentials and 
increasing their participation in tackling grand societal challenges. It 
could also help buyers’ managers improve their knowledge of the 
complex intricacies experienced by emerging economy players up-
stream, and give them a better understanding of these markets. This shift 
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in focus would require substantial commitment and a major assumption 
of responsibility on the part of the managers. Nonetheless, it would 
likely create long-term opportunities for all parties, while representing a 
stepping stone to effect positive change in supply chains. 
7.2. Limitations and avenues for future research 
This study is not without its limitations. First, it is based on fieldwork 
and interviews with informants from direct suppliers, sub-suppliers and 
NGOs, all based in Sri Lanka. Given the Sri Lankan context of excellence 
(Jayasinghe, 2016; Ruwanpura & Wrigley, 2011), these informants held 
compliance close to their hearts, but the extent to which they represent 
the apparel supply chain might be limited by geographical boundaries. 
Due to the qualitative and situated nature of the findings, further 
empirical studies are needed to verify, fine-tune, and compare insights 
on nominated procurement with informants from other geographical 
markets in the supply chain, particularly upstream raw material sup-
pliers. To date, their contribution remains completely neglected in the 
SSCM literature. 
Second, in line with previous literature, this article defined compli-
ance in terms of minimum environmental and social standards (Gimenez 
& Tachizawa, 2012; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). While this allowed a 
broader and more holistic approach to understanding the problem of 
nominated procurement in emerging economy supply chains, this 
research did not explore the degree of compliance with specific certifi-
cates or standards requested of suppliers by buyers. A granular com-
parison of specific compliance certificates would be fruitful because it 
would aid a better understanding of which certificates (environmental 
and social) are most difficult to achieve and why. 
Finally, this study operationalized supply chains as linear networks 
and spatial structures. This is a an efficient perspective from which to 
compare and contrast the interorganizational perspectives of buyers and 
multi-tier suppliers (Andersson, 2012; Öberg et al., 2012). Future SSCM 
research would benefit from integrating different theoretical perspec-
tives at the level of analysis of the individual to understand agency in 
organizations, and how these individuals can mobilize or stymie 
compliance. 
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Appendix 1. interview protocol for buyers, direct suppliers, and nominated sub-suppliers  
1. General questions 
1.1 How many people work in your firm and when was your firm created? 
1.2 What are your main products and export markets? 
1.3 Which operations do you carry out? (e.g., knitting, cut/sewing, finishing, printing) 
1.4 How much can you produce (capacity) in pieces and /or value, per year? 
1.5 Who are the buyers you work for? 
1.6 Who are your main competitors? 
1.7 What is the market situation now? 
2. Questions on compliance 
2.1 What do you do in terms of compliance? 
2.2 Which certificates do you have/request, if any? 
2.3 Which social or environmental activities beyond compliance do you do, if any? 
2.4 What are the benefits of compliance for you, if any? And activities beyond compliance? 
2.5 Do your competitors also engage in compliance as you do? And beyond? 
2.6 Does compliance pay off? What about activities beyond compliance? 
2.7 What is the corporate approach to compliance in the Sri Lankan supply chain? 
3. Questions on nominated procurement 
3.1 Could you elaborate on how the nomination process works? 
3.2 What are the benefits of nominated procurement? And for sub-suppliers specifically? 
3.3 What are the key elements that buyers seek in a nominated sub-supplier? 
3.4 Are these conditions specific to Sri Lanka or are they all international? 
3.5 Does nomination improve compliance along the chain? If so, how? If not, why? 
3.6 Could you give me any example of problems you experienced because of nomination? 
3.7 Is nomination a permanent status and, if not, how often is it reassessed? 
3.8 What are the reasons behind a nominated sub-supplier’s loss of its nomination? 
3.9 Does sub-supplier nomination improve raw material supplier compliance? How? 
4. Questions on sub-suppliers and nominated sub-suppliers (specific for direct suppliers and buyers) 
4.1 Which ones are your sub-suppliers and where are they located? 
4.2 How do you work with them and Which of them are nominated? 
4.3 How long have you been working with your nominated sub-suppliers? 
4.4 Which are the main conditions in the selection of nominated sub-suppliers? 
4.5 How do you know whether your nominated sub-suppliers are compliant? 
4.6 Do you conduct visits at the nominated sub-supplier factories? If so, how often? 
4.7 What does a general audit process at a nominated sub-supplier factory look like? 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued ) 
1. General questions 
4.8 Do you value whether your nominated sub-suppliers do any social or environmental activity beyond compliance and does that affect prices? 
4.9 What are the challenges and improvement points with your nominated sub-suppliers? 
5. Questions on direct suppliers (specific for nominated sub-suppliers and buyers) 
5.1 Who are your primary direct suppliers in your chain and where are they located? 
5.2 How long have you been working with these direct suppliers? 
5.3 Are the direct suppliers with which you work compliant? Please explain. 
5.4 Do you visit the factories of your direct suppliers? If so, how often? 
5.5 Do you value whether your sub-suppliers do any social or environmental activity beyond compliance and would that affect prices? 
5.6 How do you work together with direct suppliers for production? 
5.7 What are the direct suppliers’ main requests to you? 
5.8 What do you think are the main challenges with direct suppliers? 
6. Questions on raw material suppliers 
6.1 How do you select raw material suppliers in your chain? 
6.2 Who are your raw material suppliers and where are they located? 
6.3 What types of raw materials they mainly produce and how do you work with them? 
6.4 How long have you been working with your raw material suppliers? 
6.5 How do you know whether your raw material suppliers are compliant? Please explain. 
6.6 Do you visit and audit your raw material supplier factories? If so, how often? 
6.7 Do you value whether your raw material suppliers do any social or environmental activity beyond compliance and would that affect prices? 
6.8 Have you ever had issues or concerns with raw material suppliers? 
6.9 What are the main challenges pertaining to raw material suppliers?  
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Andersson, P., & Mölleryd, B. (1999). Channel network change and behavioral 
consequences of relationship connectedness. Journal of Business Research, 46(3), 
291–301. 
Assländer, M. S., Roloff, J., & Nayır, D. Z. (2016). Suppliers as stewards? Managing social 
standards in first- and second-tier suppliers. Journal of Business Ethics, 139(4), 
661–683. 
Athukorala, P. C., & Ekanayake, R. (2018). Repositioning in the global apparel value 
chain in the post-MFA era: Strategic issues and evidence from Sri Lanka. Development 
Policy Review, 36(S1), O247–O269. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12226. 
Awan, U., Kraslawski, A., & Huiskonen, J. (2018a). Buyer-supplier relationship on social 
sustainability: Moderation analysis of cultural intelligence. Cogent Business & 
Management, 5(1), 1429346. 
Awan, U., Kraslawski, A., & Huiskonen, J. (2018b). Governing interfirm relationships for 
social sustainability: The relationship between governance mechanisms, sustainable 
collaboration, and cultural intelligence. Sustainability, 10(12), 4473. 
Awan, U., Kraslawski, A., Huiskonen, J., & Suleman, N. (2020). Exploring the locus of 
social sustainability implementation: A South Asian perspective on planning for 
sustainable development. In W. Leal Filho, U. Tortato, & F. Frankenberger (Eds.), 
Universities and sustainable communities: Meeting the goals of the agenda 2030 (pp. 
89–105). Springer Nature Switzerland.  
Awan, U., & Sroufe, R. (2020). Interorganizational collaboration for innovation 
improvement in manufacturing: The mediating role of social performance. 
International Journal of Innovation Management, 24(05), 2050049. 
Baraldi, E., Gressetvold, E., & Harrison, D. (2012). Resource interaction in inter- 
organizational networks: Foundations, comparison, and a research agenda. Journal 
of Business Research, 65(2), 266–276. 
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Öberg, C., Huge-Brodin, M., & Björklund, M. (2012). Applying a network level in 
environmental impact assessment. Journal of Business Research, 65(2), 247–255. 
Olsen, P. I., Prenkert, F., Hoholm, T., & Harrison, D. (2014). The dynamics of networked 
power in a concentrated business network. Journal of Business Research, 67(12), 
2579–2589. 
Pagell, M., & Wu, Z. (2009). Building a more complete theory on sustainable supply 
chain management using case studies from 10 exemplars. Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, 45(2), 37–56. 
Pathirana, S., & Heenkenda, N. (2011). Pricing strategies in the garment manufacturing 
industry in Sri Lanka. Annual Research Journal of SLSAJ, 11, 84–91. 
Patton, M. (2002). Two decades of developments in qualitative inquiry: A personal, 
experiential perspective. Qualitative Social Work, 1(3), 261–283. 
Perry, P., Wood, S., & Fernie, J. (2015). Corporate social responsibility in garment 
sourcing networks: Factory management perspectives on ethical trade in Sri Lanka. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 130(3), 737–752. 
Ponte, S., & Cheyns, E. (2013). Voluntary standards, expert knowledge and the 
governance of sustainability networks. Global Networks, 13(4), 459–477. 
Preuss, L. (2007). Contribution of purchasing and supply management to ecological 
innovation. International Journal of Innovation Management, 11(4), 515–537. 
Ritter, T., Wilkinson, I. F., & Johnston, W. J. (2004). Managing in complex business 
networks. Industrial Marketing Management, 33(3), 175–183. 
Ruwanpura, K. N. (2016). Garments without guilt? Uneven labour geographies and 
ethical trading—Sri Lankan labour perspectives. Journal of Economic Geography, 16 
(2), 423–446. 
Ruwanpura, K. N., & Wrigley, N. (2011). The costs of compliance? Views of Sri Lankan 
apparel manufacturers in times of global economic crisis. Journal of Economic 
Geography, 11(6), 1–19. 
Sarkis, J., Zhu, Q., & Lai, K. (2011). An organizational theoretic review of green supply 
chain management literature. International Journal of Production Economics, 130(1), 
1–15. 
Seuring, S., & Müller, M. (2008). From a literature review to a conceptual framework for 
sustainable supply chain management. Journal of Cleaner Production, 16(15), 
1699–1710. 
Soundararajan, V., & Brammer, S. J. (2018). Developing country sub-supplier responses 
to social sustainability requirements of intermediaries: Exploring the influence of 
framing on fairness perceptions and reciprocity. Journal of Operations Management, 
58–59, 42–58. 
Sri Lanka Apparel. (2019). Data center: Textile and apparel export in US$ million. http:// 
www.srilankaapparel.com/data-center/yearly-performance/. 
Tachizawa, E. M., & Wong, C. Y. (2014). Towards a theory of multi-tier sustainable 
supply chains: A systematic literature review. Supply Chain Management: An 
International Journal, 19(5/6), 643–663. 
Talay, C., Oxborrow, L., & Brindley, C. (2018). How small suppliers deal with the buyer 
power in asymmetric relationships within the sustainable fashion supply chain. 
Journal of Business Research. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.08.034. 
Turker, D., & Altuntas, C. (2014). Sustainable supply chain management in the fast 
fashion industry: An analysis of corporate reports. European Management Journal, 32 
(5), 837–849. 
Villena, V. H., & Gioia, D. A. (2018). On the riskiness of lower-tier suppliers: Managing 
sustainability in supply networks. Journal of Operations Management, 64, 65–87. 
Walker, H., di Sisto, L., & McBain, D. (2008). Drivers and barriers to environmental 
supply chain management practices: Lessons from the public and private sector. 
Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 14(1), 69–85. 
Welch, C., & Wilkinson, I. (2005). Network perspectives on interfirm conflict: 
Reassessing a critical case in international business. Journal of Business Research, 58 
(2), 205–213. 
Wilhelm, M. M., Blome, C., Bhakoo, V., & Paulraj, A. (2016). Sustainability in multi-tier 
supply chains: Understanding the double agency role of the first-tier supplier. 
Journal of Operations Management, 41, 42–60. 
Wilhelm, M. M., Blome, C., Wieck, E., & Xiao, C. Y. (2016). Implementing sustainability 
in multi-tier supply chains: Strategies and contingencies in managing sub-suppliers. 
International Journal of Production Economics, 182, 196–212. 
World Bank. (2019). The World Bank in Sri Lanka. https://www.worldbank.org 
/en/country/srilanka/overview. 
Wycherley, I. (1999). Greening supply chains: The case of Body Shop International. 
Business Strategy and the Environment, 8(2), 120–127. 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods. Sage Publications.  
Zhu, Q., & Sarkis, J. (2006). An inter-sectoral comparison of green supply chain 
management in China: Drivers and practices. Journal of Cleaner Production, 14(5), 
475–486. 
Zhu, Q., Sarkis, J., & Lai, K. (2007). Green supply chain management: Pressures, 
practices and performance within the Chinese automobile industry. Journal of 
Cleaner Production, 15(11–12), 1041–1052. 
Dr. Enrico Fontana is a Lecturer at Sasin School of Management (Thailand) and an 
Affiliated Researcher at the Mistra Centre for Sustainable Markets at Stockholm School of 
Economics (Sweden). Enrico received his Ph.D. in Business Administration from Stock-
holm School of Economics, his MBA degree from McGill University (Canada) and he 
completed his post-doctoral studies at Gustavson School of Business, University of Victoria 
(Canada). His PhD and current work are focused on corporate social responsibility and 
corporate sustainability in the apparel supply chains of South and South East Asia. Enrico 
has published his work in multiple academic outlets, such as the Journal of Business Ethics. 
Before embarking on his PhD studies, Enrico worked for six years as market manager in the 
apparel industry in Asia and Europe. 
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